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REHABILITATING OPIOID 
REGULATION: A PRESCRIPTION FOR 
THE FDA’S NEXT PROPOSAL OF AN 
OPIOID RISK EVALUATION AND 
MITIGATION STRATEGY (REMS) 
Hilary Homenko† 
“We are going to need to find a balance between en-
suring patients can achieve adequate pain control 
with access to opioid therapies while taking steps to 
protect against addiction and death.”1 
“FDA is not going to be able to do this alone.”2 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Abuse and dependence on prescription pain relievers has reached 
epidemic proportions in the United States.3   In 2010, a study pub-
lished by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Admini-
stration estimated that 5.1 million persons, aged twelve or older, use 
prescription pain relievers non-medically.4  Within this population, 
approximately 1.9 million persons have dependence on or abuse pre-
scription pain relievers.5  While prescription pain relievers, commonly 
  
 3 See Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: 
Summary of National Findings, SAMHSA.GOV, 1 (Sept. 2011), 
http://oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf. 
 4 Id. at 12. 
 5 Id. at 70. 
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referred to as opioids, effectively reduce chronic and acute pain, no 
one seems spared from the health risks associated with them.6  Be-
tween 1998 and 2008, the percentage of hospital admissions involving 
opioid abuse increased by 7.6 percent, with significant increases 
across every age cohort and racial category.7   
In 2007, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendment Act (FDAAA), which gave the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) greater authority to regulate prescription drugs, 
including opioids.8  Congress specifically granted the FDA the author-
ity to require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) as 
part of a drug approval application.9  A REMS is a written plan devel-
oped by a drug manufacturer that identifies the risks associated with a 
particular prescription drug and describes the program(s) that a manu-
facturer will implement to help prevent the risks from materializing.10  
Programs may include, but are not limited to, a medication guide or a 
special training program for health care providers prescribing the 
manufacturer’s drugs.11  The FDA can require manufacturers to sub-
mit a REMS with a drug approval application.12  Alternatively, it can 
require a manufacturer to submit a REMS after drug approval, when 
newly discovered information brings into question whether the bene-
fits of the drug outweigh its risks.13  
Recently, the FDA experienced a setback with regard to improv-
ing opioid regulation through REMS.  In July 2010, the Anesthetic 
and Life Support Drug Advisory Committee and the Drug Safety and 
Risk Management Advisory Committee evaluated the FDA’s proposal 
for an opioid REMS, meaning a standard written plan that all manu-
facturers would have to complete, if they sought drug approval for an 
opioid.14  The advisory committees rejected the FDA’s initial proposal 
  
 6 Jane C. Ballantyne & Jianren Mao, Medical Progress: Opioid Therapy for 
Chronic Pain, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 1943, 1943 (2003). 
 7 The TEDS Report: Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions Involving 
Abuse of Pain Relievers: 1998 and 2008, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVS. ADMIN., 1 (July 15, 2011), 
http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k10/230/230PainRelvr2k10Web.pdf. 
 8 See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 21 U.S.C. § 
355-1 (2011) [hereinafter FDAAA].  
 9 Id. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. § 355-1(e). 
 12 Id. § 355-1(a)(1). 
 13 Id. § 355-1(a)(2)(A). 
 14 Having an opioid REMS would improve the FDA’s efficiency during the 
drug approval process.  An opioid REMS would eliminate the need for the FDA to 
design a unique set of REMS requirements for each manufacturer seeking drug ap-
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because they thought the regulations applying to doctor training were 
too weak.15  Going forward, the FDA should focus its efforts on 
strengthening the regulatory requirements under the next opioid 
REMS proposal.  However, the FDA cannot single-handedly solve all 
of the opioid-related drug problems through REMS.  The FDA should 
collaborate with regulatory agencies at the state level to achieve the 
proper balance between opioid regulation and medically necessary 
opioid use. 
This Note will explore current opioid-related drug problems in the 
United States and will make recommendations for how the FDA 
should proceed with developing an opioid REMS. Part I of this Note 
will discuss the current problems associated with opioids, including 
(1) misuse and abuse, (2) drug diversion, and (3) undertreatment of 
chronic and acute pain.  Part II will explain the FDA’s authority be-
fore and after Congress enacted the FDAAA, specifically describing 
the new three-tiered regulatory strategy that the FDA can employ to 
regulate drugs after the approval process.  Part II will also explain the 
benefits of having a general opioid REMS, which include improved 
efficiency of the FDA’s drug approval process and increased manu-
facturer compliance with REMS requirements.  Part III will identify 
why both the initial opioid REMS proposal and the FDAAA fell short 
of addressing the problems discussed in Part I.  Finally, Part IV will 
recommend that the next opioid REMS proposal contain a mandatory 
training program, funded by manufacturers, for the purpose of educat-
ing doctors about the risks of prescribing opioids.  Part IV will also 
outline an approach for improving opioid regulation outside of REMS 
by encouraging FDA collaboration with the states, since state medical 
boards have the authority to directly regulate doctors who prescribe 
opioids.16  Through greater collaboration with regulatory agencies at 
the state level, the FDA can successfully reduce opioid risks without 
sacrificing the availability of chronic and acute pain relief. 
 
 
  
proval for an opioid.  See Transcript for FDA’s Media Briefing on the Safe Use of 
Opioids, FDA (Feb. 9, 2009),  
www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/MediaTranscripts/ 
UCM166237.pdf. 
 15 See Joint Meeting of the Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory 
Committee & Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee, FDA, 217 
(July 23, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
AdvisoryCommit-
tees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/AnestheticAndLifeSupportDrugsAdvisoryC
ommittee/UCM224671.pdf [hereinafter Joint Meeting Transcript]. 
 16 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 271-72 (2006).   
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I. PROBLEMS ENDEMIC TO OPIOID USE 
 
A. Abuse and Misuse by Chronic and Acute Pain   
Patients 
 
1. Early Opioid Regulation 
 
Opium has been used around the world for centuries to alleviate 
pain.17   In 1806, a German pharmacist isolated a pure substance from 
the opium poppy plant, which he called morphine.18  His work in-
spired scientists several years later to create synthetic versions of the 
chemicals extracted from the opium poppy plants.19  Medications con-
taining these synthetic chemicals are known as opioids.   
In the nineteenth century, nonmedical use of opioids and other 
drugs such as heroine became increasingly popular.20  Due to the 
health risks posed by these drugs when used inappropriately, opioids 
became strictly regulated by some local and state laws by the end of 
the century.21  For example, San Francisco passed a local law in 1875 
that prohibited people from smoking opium in places other than an 
opium den, while other cities passed laws that prohibited opium use 
altogether.22  In the cities that adopted stricter policies, opioids be-
came unavailable to many people legitimately seeking pain relief.23   
Fortunately, in the twentieth century, opioids became accepted 
again as a mainstream medical treatment for acute and chronic pain.24  
In 1996, the American Society of Anesthesiology adopted guidelines 
for treating chronic pain, which made recommendations about evalu-
ating patients for drug therapies involving opioids.25  Opioid pain re-
  
 17 Ballantyne & Mao, supra note 6, at 1943.  
 18 The German pharmacist, Friedrich Wilhelm Adam Sertürner, named the 
chemical morphine after Morpheus, the Greek god of dreams.  Ryan J. Huxtable & 
Stephan K. W. Schwarz, The Isolation of Morphine: First Principles in Science and 
Ethics, 1 MOLECULAR INTERVENTIONS 189, 189 (2001), available at 
http://molinterv.aspetjournals.org/content/1/4/189.full.pdf+html.  
 19 Id. at 191. 
 20 Ballantyne & Mao, supra note 6, at 1943. 
 21 Id.  The first federal law to regulate drugs did not occur until the Pure 
Food and Drug Act of 1906.  Nat’l Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treat-
ment, A History of Opiate Opioid Laws in the United States, NAABT.ORG, 
http://www.naabt.org/laws.cfm (last updated July 27, 2011). 
 22 Nat’l Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment, supra note 21. 
 23 Ballantyne & Mao, supra note 6, at 1943. 
 24 Id.  
 25 See Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, Practice Guidelines for Chronic Pain 
Management, 112 ANESTHESIOLOGY 810, 817-19 (2010). 
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lievers commonly used today include morphine, hydrocodone, and 
oxycodone.26   
 
2. Illustrations of Opioid Abuse and Misuse 
 
One of the prevailing problems associated with treating chronic 
and acute pain is opioid abuse and misuse.  While the terms “abuse” 
and “misuse” are often defined as different drug-related behaviors, it 
is hard to clearly distinguish between them in practical terms.27   
Suppose a doctor writes a prescription for patient A.  It is for a 
high dose of oxycodone to be taken over the course of several weeks, 
while the patient recovers from a serious knee surgery.28  Patient A’s 
chart indicates that he has a history of substance abuse.  After finish-
ing the prescription, patient A’s knee pain is gone, but he experiences 
withdrawal symptoms after being without oxycodone for several 
hours.  Patient A returns to his doctor and falsely reports severe knee 
pain.  During the office visit, patient A also exhibits signs of with-
drawal including goose bumps and dilated pupils.29  Nonetheless, pa-
tient A successfully receives another prescription of oxycodone and 
repeats this behavior several more times.  Patient A likely falls into 
the category of abuse because he knowingly misrepresented his medi-
cal condition to the doctor for the purpose of obtaining a medically 
unnecessary prescription.  The doctor is likely at fault for prescribing 
  
 26 Morphine can be isolated from opium poppy seeds and alterations to its 
molecular structure create a semi-synthetic compound.  See Scott C. Armstrong & 
Kelly L. Cozza, Pharmacokinetic Drug Interactions of Morphine, Codeine, and Their 
Derivatives: Theory and Clinical Reality, Part II, 44 PSYCHOSOMATICS 515, 516 
(2003); Laxmaiah Manchikanti, National Drug Control Policy and Prescription Drug 
Abuse: Facts and Fallacies, 10 PAIN PHYSICIAN 399, 401 (2007). 
 27 The World Health Organization adopted the following definitions from the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IIIR), which is a manual that assists clini-
cians in diagnosing psychiatric disorders.  “Abuse” means “a maladaptive pattern of 
use ...despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social, occupational, psy-
chological or physical problem that is caused…[by] recurrent use….”  Similarly, 
“misuse” means “[u]se of a substance for a purpose not consistent with legal or medi-
cal guidelines, as in the non-medical use of prescription medications.”  Reference to 
the WHO definitions is necessary because FDA definitions for “abuse” and “misuse” 
do not yet exist.  Furthermore, while “abuse” and “misuse” are often used colloquially 
to describe individuals who intentionally use or deal illicit drugs, such an inference 
should not be made when reading this Note.  See Lexicon of Alcohol and Drug Terms 
by the World Health Organization, WHO, 
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/who_lexicon/en/ (last visited Oct. 
4, 2011).  
 28 See Andrea M. Trescot et al., Opioid Guidelines in the Management of 
Chronic Non-Cancer Pain, 9 PAIN PHYSICIAN 1, 14 (2006). 
 29 Id. at 16. 
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high doses of opioids to a patient with a history of substance abuse.  
The doctor may be subject to liability for failing to perform a thor-
ough physical examination at the follow-up visit, which likely would 
have detected the patient’s withdrawal symptoms and underlying ad-
diction. 
Now suppose the doctor writes the same oxycodone prescription 
for patient B, who has also recently undergone serious knee surgery.  
After a few days of taking the prescription, patient B is still experienc-
ing persistent knee pain.  To try and alleviate the pain, patient B de-
cides to take the dose twice as frequently as the doctor prescribed.  
Patient B returns to the doctor two weeks early to refill his prescrip-
tion.  He honestly reports knee pain and does not exhibit any obvious 
signs of withdrawal.   Patient B may fall into the category of misuse 
for taking his prescription against medical instructions.  If this behav-
ior persists, however, patient B may also fall into the category of 
abuse.  Due to the overlap of terminology, in this Note the terms 
“abuse and misuse” will be used collectively to describe both (1) a 
physician administering opioids contrary to the practices of a reason-
able physician, and (2) a patient taking opioids contrary to the instruc-
tions of a reasonable physician.   
 
3. Clinical Origins of Opioid Abuse and Misuse 
 
While opioids have been used as pain relievers for hundreds of 
years, only recently has the medical field made recommendations on 
how they should be administered to patients.30  In 1998, the Federa-
tion of State Medical Boards published its first set of model guidelines 
for using opioids to treat pain.31  The guidelines apply to doctors treat-
ing both acute and chronic pain patients.32  Professional organizations, 
such as the American Society of Anesthesiology, have also developed 
guidelines that recommend quasi-objective methods for measuring a 
patient’s pain.33  For example, the guidelines suggest that doctors ask 
  
 30 See Ballantyne & Mao, supra note 6, at 1943.  
 31 See Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treat-
ment of Pain, FEDERATION OF STATE MED. BOARDS OF THE U.S., 1 (May 2004), 
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2004_grpol_Controlled_Substances.pdf.  
 32 Trescot, supra note 28, at 2, 12, 14.  Acute pain patients typically experi-
ence pain for a short, discrete period of time and the pain disappears when treatment 
resolves an underlying medical condition such as disease or infection.  Chronic pain 
patients typically experience pain that persists for a long period of time and that does 
not respond to ordinary pain medication.  See Acute v. Chronic Pain, CLEVELAND 
CLINIC,http://my.clevelandclinic.org/services/pain_management/hic_acute_vs_chroni
c_pain.aspx (last updated Sept. 12, 2008). 
 33 See Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, supra note 25. 
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patients to rate their pain intensity on a numerical scale.34  Doctors are 
instructed to record the result at each visit in order to track the pa-
tient’s progress over time.35  Although the numerical measurement is 
based on the patient’s subjective pain experience, it is quasi-objective 
when compared to feedback from the same patient during previous 
visits.   
Despite the medical field’s efforts to objectively measure pain, it 
remains a substantially subjective experience, which can only be con-
veyed through a patient’s self-report.36  Researchers have found that 
emotional, mental, physical, and spiritual factors influence a patient’s 
pain perception.37  For example, one study observed that the gender of 
the examiner influenced a patient’s feedback about pain.38   Patients 
tolerated pain for longer periods of time before expressing it when the 
examiner was the opposite gender.39  When pain reaches the threshold 
of evoking a response, patients generally communicate through words 
or expressions.40  However, language barriers due to national origin or 
disability may further diminish a patient’s ability to communicate.41  
Pain reports by disabled patients may be limited to sounds, facial ex-
pressions, or translations of a guardian or interpreter.42   
Since doctors are limited by the information they can gather about 
a patient, a doctor’s diagnosis is only as accurate as her understanding 
of the patient’s pain experience.  Sometimes a doctor may prescribe a 
dose that is too low, and the patient remains in pain—a situation 
commonly known as undertreatment.43  Undertreatment is estimated 
to occur in 43 percent of cancer patients seeking relief from acute 
pain.44  On the other hand, doctors may prescribe a dose that is too 
  
 34 Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, Practice Guidelines for Cancer Pain 
Management: A Report by the American Society of Anesthesiologists Task Force on 
Pain Management, 84 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1243, 1245 (1996).  
 35 See id. 
 36 Some researchers have begun to experiment with functional MRI technol-
ogy, which would enable medical professionals to observe the brain’s physical re-
sponse to pain, but it is still doubtful that this technology would replace a patient’s 
subjective feedback.  Adam Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective 
Experience, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 433, 447 (2007); see also Trescot, supra note 28, at 
3.  
 37 Trescot, supra note 28, at 27.  
 38 Kolber, supra note 36, at 446-47.   
 39 Id.    
 40 Id. at 440. 
 41 See id.  
 42 See id.  
 43 See S. Deandrea et al., Prevalence of Undertreatment in Cancer Pain: A 
Review of Published Literature, 19 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 1985, 1987 (2008).  
 44 The estimate was based on a review of twenty-six other studies.  Id. 
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high or prescribe opioids for too long, resulting in addiction.  In the 
past decade, the rate of opioid addiction in patients seeking relief from 
chronic pain was estimated to be 3.27 percent.45  Another study esti-
mated, however, that abuse risk ranges between 0–50 percent for 
chronic pain patients.46   Patients fall at the higher end of the range, if 
they have a history of substance abuse or addiction.47  Due to the dif-
ficulty in properly prescribing opioids, patients may experience prob-
lems like opioid addiction at one end of the spectrum and undertreat-
ment at the opposite end.  Understanding the relationship between 
these two opioid-related problems is crucial to finding the proper bal-
ance between opioid regulation and medically necessary opioid use. 
 
4. Potential Magnitude of Opioid Abuse and 
Misuse 
 
The potential magnitude of opioid abuse is alarming considering 
that, in 2007, doctors wrote 21 million opioid prescriptions for 3.7 
million individuals.48  The high volume of opioid prescriptions re-
flects a decade of escalating opioid prescribing habits.  Between 1992 
and 2002, the U.S. population increased by 13 percent, but prescrip-
tions for noncontrolled substances increased by 57 percent, and pre-
scriptions for controlled substances increased by 154 percent.49  Dur-
ing a similar time period, the number of people abusing controlled 
substances jumped 94 percent, which is twice the increase in mari-
juana abuse, five times the increase in cocaine abuse, and sixty times 
  
 45 The estimate was made from reviewing twenty-four studies involving a 
total of 2,507 subjects.  David A. Fishbain et al., What Percentage of Chronic Non-
malignant Pain Patients Exposed to Chronic Opioid Analgesic Therapy Develop 
Abuse/Addiction and/or Aberrant Drug-Related Behaviors? A Structured Evidence-
Based Review, 9 PAIN MED. 444, 444 (2008).   
 46 An international literature review identifies the range in addiction preva-
lence for chronic non-malignant patients between 0 percent and 50 percent, while the 
prevalence of opioid addiction in cancer treatment between 0 percent and 7.7 percent.  
See Jette Højsted & Per Sjøgren, Addiction to Opioids in Chronic Pain Patients: A 
Literature Review, 11 EUR. J. PAIN 490, 490 (2007). 
 47 Id. at 494.  
 48 Transcript for FDA’s Media Briefing on the Safe Use of Opioids, supra 
note 14, at 9. 
 49 See JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV. (CASA), UNDER THE COUNTER: THE DIVERSION AND 
ABUSE OF CONTROLLED PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN THE U.S., iii (July 2005), 
http://www.casacolumbia.org/download.aspx?path=/UploadedFiles/tt3bl4lk.pdf.Opioi
ds are a controlled substance under Schedules I-V of the DEA’s regulatory scheme. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2011).  
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the increase in heroin abuse.50  Although there are several types of 
opioids, the risks appear to be consistent across drug classes.  Pain 
physicians agree that both extended-release and immediate-release 
opioids have a high potential for abuse.51   
Creating even greater concern is the possibility that various re-
porting systems actually underestimate the prevalence of opioid 
abuse.  For example, the FDA’s Adverse Events Reporting System 
(AERS) tracks adverse drug experiences and errors in how drugs are 
prescribed.52  Health providers voluntarily participate in reporting data 
to this system, while manufacturers are required to participate when 
they become aware of an adverse drug event.53  Any system that at-
tempts to collect information on drug abuse likely underestimates its 
prevalence because drug abuse is an inherently clandestine activity.54  
People may not seek medical care for an adverse event arising out of 
drug abuse because they are ashamed of their addiction or afraid of 
getting in trouble.55  Subsequently, providers and manufacturers often 
never find out about the adverse event and never have an opportunity 
to report it.  And even if providers treat a patient who experienced an 
adverse event, they may not report it to the data collection system, 
either because they do not know how to do so or they find it too bur-
densome.  Consequently, the data reflects only what the patients and 
providers voluntarily report to the system and what the manufacturers 
are aware of and required to report.   
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) also 
collects data about drug abuse and misuse through the Drug Abuse 
Warning Network (DAWN).  DAWN tracks drug-related emergency 
  
 50 JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, NATIONAL CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
AT COLUMBIA UNIV. (CASA), supra note 49, at i. 
 51 Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 172. 
 52 AERS is a database of information regarding adverse drug events that the 
FDA uses to monitor approved drugs and therapeutic biologic products.  See Adverse 
Event Reporting System (AERS), FDA,  
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/
AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 2009); The FDA’s definition 
of “adverse drug experience” includes “any failure of expected pharmacological 
action of the drug.” See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(1) (2011).  
 53 See Records and Reports, 21 C.F.R. § 310.305(a) (2011); see also Adverse 
Event Reporting System, supra note 52. 
 54 See John J. Coleman, REMS for Opioids: A Review and Critique, 37 
PHARMACY PRACTICE NEWS 42, 43 (2010).  Many states also have their own data 
collection and reporting system; the systems provide limited value because they are 
often not capable of sharing data between states.  See also Trescot, supra note 28, at 
9. 
 55 See Coleman, supra note 54, at 43.  
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admissions and drug-related deaths at both a local and national level.56  
The data is collected from emergency departments and coroners’ of-
fices in thirteen metropolitan areas around the country.57  The extent 
of data collection, however, is dependent on the ability of DAWN’s 
staff to recruit and secure hospital participation in the program.58  An-
other limitation of DAWN’s data collection is that the areas where 
opioid abuse appears to be most prevalent are not necessarily the same 
places where DAWN collects data.  Southeastern and western states 
are home to the teenagers most likely to abuse prescription pain re-
lievers, but  these states are not well-represented by the metropolitan 
areas targeted under DAWN.59  Realizing the limitations of national 
data collection systems is important for properly analyzing data, 
which will be used to develop the next general opioid REMS pro-
posal.   
 
5. Financial Impact of Opioid Abuse and Misuse 
 
Without prompt changes to the current opioid regulatory scheme, 
opioid abuse will continue to place an enormous financial burden on 
society.  Opioid abusers accrue medical expenses at a significantly 
higher rate than non-abusers.60  In 2003, the annual direct cost of 
health care for an opioid abuser was on average $15,884, compared to 
$1,830 for a non-abuser.61  This estimate does not account for indirect 
costs, such as the loss of productivity, caused by drug abuse and sub-
sequent illness.62  When the researchers controlled for health care 
  
 56 The Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 290aa-4) granted the Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) the authority to 
collect data through DAWN.  See ED Reference Guide, DAWN, 2 (Jan. 2009), 
https://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/files/collect_2009-2011/ed_reference_guide_2009-
2011.pdf. SAMHSA is associated with the U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services. Id. 
 57 The areas include Boston, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Miami/Ft. 
Lauderdale, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York Boroughs, Phoenix, San Diego, 
San Francisco, and Seattle.  Id. at 3. 
 58 See id. at 1.  
 59 The states with the highest percentages of teenagers (12-17 years of age) 
using prescription pain relievers for non-medical purposes are: Arkansas (10.3 per-
cent), Kentucky (9.8 percent), Montana (9.6 percent), Oregon (9.3 percent), Okla-
homa (9.1 percent), Tennessee (8.9 percent), and West Virginia (8.9 percent).  Man-
chikanti, supra note 26, at 404.  
 60 See Alan G. White et al., Direct Costs of Opioid Abuse in an Insured 
Population in the United States, 11 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 469, 473 (2005) 
(finding that the average direct cost of health care for 740 opioid abusers was more 
than 8 times higher than those of non-abusers). 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. at 475. 
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costs associated with the subjects’ comorbidities, they found that the 
direct cost of health care for drug abusers still exceeded non-abusers 
by at least 1.8 times.63  The escalated cost of health care for drug 
abusers is attributable to a higher frequency of hospitalizations and 
emergency room visits.64  
Once individuals begin to comprehend the direct health care costs 
associated with opioid abuse, they may impulsively blame the patients 
who abuse and misuse opioids.  Media outlets often fuel this view, 
disparaging celebrity drug abusers as individuals intentionally decid-
ing to use drugs in harmful and irresponsible ways.65  Yet, as our un-
derstanding of drug abuse develops, it appears that drug abuse prob-
lems in pain patients often develop unintentionally.66  For example, 
consider the testimony of Betty Tully, a patient who suffered from 
back pain.   
 
I am a formerly diagnosed chronic pain patient who was mispre-
scribed large amounts of opiates . . . .  I went to the doctor for 
help with my back pain.  I got little else than narcotics,67 along 
with a devastating addiction.  I was also not aware that many doc-
tors have as little as 12 hours [of] education in narcotic pharma-
cology, yet receive licenses to prescribe every scheduled drug 
manufactured and virtually no restrictions on practices.68      
   
Several factors may have contributed to this patient’s addiction, 
including the doctor’s limited training in prescribing opioids and the 
patient’s poor understanding of opioid risks.  In 2007, these shortcom-
ings likely encouraged Congress to pass the FDAAA.  As the FDA 
works on developing the next opioid REMS proposal, it should con-
tinue to discuss issues such as physician training and patient educa-
tion.  Patients like Betty Tully are not drug addicts looking for an op-
portunity to get high.  Regulatory solutions should encourage doctors 
to treat patients like Betty Tully with respect and help them access 
safe pain relief. 
 
  
 63 Id.  
 64 Id.  
 65 See e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Charges Against Jackson’s Doctors Are 
Expected Monday, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A11; see also Party and Punishment, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 24, 2010, at 18.  
 66 See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 45-47. 
 67 The term “narcotics” can refer to addictive drugs that bind to opiate recep-
torsor to any illicit substance.  Narcotics, DEA, 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/narcotics.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
 68 Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 45-47. 
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B. Opioid Diversion 
Another common problem associated with opioids is known as 
diversion, which in the drug context refers to “any criminal act that 
causes controlled prescription drugs to be sidetracked from their law-
ful (medical) purpose to illicit use.”69  Through diversion, third parties 
become subject to the same risks of abuse and misuse as patients re-
ceiving the drugs directly from doctors.  In fact, third parties may be 
even more susceptible to the risks because they are not taking the 
drugs under the careful supervision of a health care professional.  
Surprisingly, only a limited number of doctors are educated about 
the problem of drug diversion during their medical training.  The Na-
tional Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia Univer-
sity (CASA) reported that only 19.1 percent of 979 doctors surveyed 
had training in medical school about prescription drug diversion and 
only 39.2 percent received training about it in their residency pro-
gram.70  Experienced doctors, however, are often more aware of the 
problems that diversion creates.  They encounter diversion in the form 
of “doctor shopping,” which means that a patient sees multiple doc-
tors concurrently to obtain several prescriptions for pain medication.71  
They also see patients who try to acquire pain prescriptions by lying 
or misleading doctors through dishonest claims of acute or chronic 
pain.72  Additionally, pharmacists encounter patients who attempt to 
fill prescriptions with forged or altered prescription forms.73   
While drug diversion is generally thought of as patient-initiated, a 
small segment of doctors help perpetuate the criminal activity.  The 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has led several successful 
criminal investigations of doctors suspected of facilitating drug diver-
sion.74  Courts have convicted doctors on charges such as “criminal 
conspiracy to commit delivery of or possession with the intent to de-
liver a controlled substance.”75  Since the DEA and a growing number 
of state licensure boards have jurisdiction over this issue,76 drug diver-
sion facilitated by doctors was not likely a prominent regulatory goal 
  
 69 JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, NATIONAL CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
AT COLUMBIA UNIV. (CASA), supra note 49, at 45. 
 70 Id. at 6.  
 71 Id. at 45.  
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See e.g., Cases Against Doctors, DEA, 2 (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/crim_admin_actions/doctors_criminal_cases.pdf. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2011); Standards for the Use of Controlled 
Substances for the Treatment of Pain, FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 64B8-9.013(1)(d) (2011).  
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of the FDAAA.  Nonetheless, diversion remains an important part of 
how patients and third parties gain access to opioids for nonmedical 
purposes.  Thus, diversion should be a part of FDA discussions about 
interpreting the FDAAA and developing the next opioid REMS pro-
posal.     
 
C. Undertreatment of Pain 
 
Another major problem associated with opioids is undertreatment 
of pain.  Undertreatment typically arises when a doctor either declines 
to write an opioid prescription or writes a prescription that is too weak 
to alleviate the patient’s pain.77  Undertreatment is common in acute 
pain patients, especially those with cancer.78  The underlying explana-
tion for undertreatment is “opiophobia,” which is defined as “exces-
sive concern about the addictive potential and side effects of narcot-
ics.”79   
A doctor’s willingness to prescribe opioids may be subcon-
sciously influenced by several factors.  Some medical studies suggest 
that a patient’s race closely correlates with whether they will receive a 
prescription for opioids in the emergency room.80  For example, His-
panics who visit the emergency room for a broken bone are less likely 
to receive opioid pain relievers than non-Hispanic whites.81  One ex-
planation for this racial bias is that doctors tend to perceive certain 
individuals as exaggerating their pain more than others.82  Age is an-
other factor that appears to influence doctors when determining 
whether to prescribe opioids to an emergency room patient.  One 
  
 77 See Deandrea, supra note 43, at 1987.   
 78 Id.   
 79 See Rima J. Oken, Curing Healthcare Providers’ Failure to Administer 
Opiates in the Treatment of Severe Pain, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1932-1940 
(2002); Julie A. Steele, Cancer Pain: Its Management Emerges as a Public Health 
Issue, 82 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 646, 646 (1990) (quoting Dr. June Dahl, Ph.D., of 
the University of Wisconsin Medical School and chair of the Wisconsin Cancer Pain 
Initiative).  
 80 See, e.g., Mark J. Pletcher et al., Trends in Opioid Prescribing by 
Race/Ethnicity for Patients Seeking Care in US Emergency Departments, 299 JAMA 
70, 70 (2008); Joshua H. Tamayo-Sarver et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Emergency Department Analgesic Prescription, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2067 (2003); 
Mark A. Hostetler, et al., Parenteral Analgesic and Sedative Use Among ED Patients 
in the United States: Combined Results from the National Hospital Ambulatory Medi-
cal Care Survey (NHAMCS) 1992-1997, 20 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 139, 139 
(2002). 
 81 Pletcher, supra note 80, at 70.   
 82 Opioid prescribing is just one of several areas of medicine where a pa-
tient’s race has been found to influence a doctor’s treatment approach.  See Pletcher, 
supra note 80, at 76.  
2012] REHABILITATING OPIOID REGULATION 287 
study found that patients were significantly less likely to receive a 
prescription for opioids, if they were eighty years of age or older.83  
The study suggested that this age bias is due to a lack of understand-
ing about how to properly manage pain in elderly patients.84 
Fears of legal liability for prescribing opioids may also influence 
a doctor’s medical decision making.  Doctors likely consider the po-
tential consequences of civil sanctions from the DEA85 or the potential 
loss of their medical license, if disciplined by the state medical 
board.86  Additionally, doctors may fear potential criminal sanctions 
imposed by local, state, or federal authorities for inappropriately pre-
scribing opioids.87  Prescribing guidelines issued by organizations 
such as the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) have tried to 
address these concerns by stating that “[p]hysicians should not fear 
disciplinary action from the Board for ordering, prescribing, dispens-
ing or administering controlled substances, including opioid analge-
sics, for a legitimate medical purpose and in the course of professional 
practice.”88  Some courts have even held doctors liable for undertreat-
ing a patient’s pain.  In the past decade, plaintiffs have brought suc-
cessful cases against doctors who denied necessary pain medication to 
prison inmates and nursing home patients.89 
The problem of undertreatment, however, is not a widely recog-
nized problem.  Critics argue that undertreatment is only a perception 
  
 83 Kevin M. Terrell et al., Analgesic Prescribing for Patients who are Dis-
charged from an Emergency Department, 11 PAIN MED. 1072, 1076 (2010). 
 84 Id. 
 85 The DEA has authority to enforce civil penalties up to $25,000 for violat-
ing controlled substance registration requirements such as documentation.  See e.g., 
21 U.S.C. § 842(c) (2011). 
 86 See, e.g., Disciplinary Guidelines, FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 64B8-8.001(2) 
(2011). 
 87 For example, the DEA has authority to enforce criminal penalties of im-
prisonment not exceeding four years on individuals who try to use a fictitious or 
revoked DEA registration number to acquire or obtain controlled substances.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 843(d) (2011). 
 88 Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment 
of Pain, supra note 31, at 3. 
 89 See, e.g., Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1040-41 (2002) (remanding 
the case to the district court because the court thought that a nurse and a doctor should 
not have refused to provide Walker pain medication); Sasser v. Ryder Truck 
Rental, No. 2:06cv593-CSC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160, at *23, 33 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 
2, 2008) (finding plaintiff, who was not an inmate, failed to provide sufficient evi-
dence showing that his employer was systematically trying to cut him off from neces-
sary medical treatment, which included a pain prescription for oxycontin); Kathryn 
Tucker, Medico-Legal Case Report and Commentary: Inadequate Pain Management 
in the Context of Terminal Cancer. The Case of Lester Tomlinson, 5 PAIN MED. 214 
(2004) (discussing Tomlinson v. Bayberry Care Ctr., No. C-02-00120 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Contra Costa County 2003)).  
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and not a reality.90  They argue that the alleged racial bias actually 
results from doctors over-prescribing opioids to one racial group and 
prescribing appropriate levels of opioids to another.91  Their explana-
tion is that emergency room doctors have less experience recognizing 
signs of abuse in white patients compared to other racial groups.92   
Despite these criticisms, undertreatment is well-documented in re-
search studies and litigation against doctors, both of which provide 
sufficient justification for addressing undertreatment of pain in the 
next opioid REMS proposal.  
 
II. CHANGES TO FDA AUTHORITY  
A. FDA Authority Prior to the FDAAA 
The FDA has traditionally acted as the “gate keeper” for approv-
ing prescription drugs, including opioids.93  Congress specifically 
tasked the FDA with regulating the safety of food, human and veteri-
nary drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics.94  With respect to drugs, 
the FDA controls over-the-counter and prescription drug approvals, 
labeling, and manufacturing standards.95  The FDA enforces these 
standards by regulating manufacturers because they are responsible 
for developing, packaging, and distributing the drugs.96  The FDA’s 
authority to regulate drugs does not extend to illegal substances such 
as cocaine and heroin because these substances are under the jurisdic-
tion of the DEA.97   
The scope of the FDA’s authority to regulate drugs is expansive 
when compared to the narrow scope of the DEA’s authority to regu-
late drug diversion.   While the FDA regulates drug approval, label-
ing, marketing, and use, the DEA focuses on prescription and distribu-
  
 90 See Pletcher, supra note 80, at 76. 
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. 
 93 See Andrew C. von Eschenbach, M.D., Comm’r of Food and Drugs, FDA 
at a Turning Point: Meeting the Challenge of a Rapidly Changing World, Speech 
Before the National Press Club (Feb. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm051551.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 
2011).  
 94 See generally Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 
(2011).  
 95 See id. § 355.  
 96 The laws regarding the FDA’s authority, specifically the drug approval 
process, allows the FDA to regulate manufacturers.  See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 
(2011). 
 97 Heroin is in Schedule II(a)(1)-(3) and cocaine is in Schedule II(a)(4). See 
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2011).  
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tion.98  The roles of these agencies, however, have created some over-
lap of authority.  When the DEA is deciding how to schedule a certain 
drug,99 the FDA makes scientific recommendations to the DEA about 
the drug’s abuse potential, which the FDA discovers through clinical 
studies required during the drug approval process.100    
The FDA’s scope of authority has gradually expanded during the 
last two decades.  In 1992, Congress gave the FDA the authority to 
charge drug manufacturers fees for seeking drug approval through the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA).101  Congress wanted the 
FDA to use the fees to hire more staff and expedite the drug approval 
process.102  Every five years PDUFA is eligible for reauthorization,103 
and each time, Congress has reauthorized it.104   
In 2006, Congress authorized the FDA to require RiskMAPs as 
part of the drug approval process.  A RiskMAP consisted of a written 
risk evaluation of a proposed drug, completed by the manufacturer.105  
The authorization from Congress came after the FDA stated in its 
guidance to the pharmaceutical industry that there was a need to as-
sess and minimize risks associated with prescription drugs.106  The 
  
 98 See Oxycontin and Beyond: Examining the Role of FDA and DEA in Regu-
lating Prescription Painkillers, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs 
of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform 109th Cong., U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, 2 (Sept. 
13, 2005), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg24947/pdf/CHRG-
109hhrg24947.pdf. 
 99 Scheduling refers to the level of regulation DEA applies to the distribution 
and prescription of a certain drug. There are five drug schedules where Schedule I 
contains the most dangerous and highly-regulated drugs and Schedule V contains the 
least dangerous and minimally-regulated drugs.   See id. at 5-6. 
 100 When deciding how to schedule a drug, the DEA considers the drug’s 
potential for abuse, patterns of actual abuse including scope and duration, scientific 
evidence, risks to public health, psychological or physiological effect of addiction, 
and relation to drugs already controlled by the DEA. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (2011). 
 101 See 21 U.S.C. § 379(h) (2011); see also Cameron Rhudy, How Congress 
May Have Failed Consumers with the Food and Drug Administration Amendments 
Act of 2007, 27 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 99, 99-100 (2008). 
 102 See Rhudy, supra note 101, at 99-100. 
 103 Id. at 100. 
 104 The most recent PDUFA reauthorization occurred in 2007 under the Food 
and Drug Administration Act, which granted $29.3 million towards improving the 
drug approval process.  Id. at 103. 
 105 See Kathryn Foxhall, FDA Considers Making Changes to RiskMAPs, 
DRUG TOPICS (July 23, 2007), 
http://drugtopics.modernmedicine.com/drugtopics/Safety/FDA-considers-making-
changes-to-RiskMAPs/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/442605 (last visited Oct. 4, 
2011). 
 106 FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES 
AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT 2-3 (Mar. 2005), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126834.pdf. 
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FDA described risk management as a process of steps by which a 
manufacturer (1) assesses the risk-benefit of a product, (2) develops 
and implements tools to minimize risk, (3) evaluates the effectiveness 
of the tools, and (4) makes adjustments to further assess the risk-
benefit balance.107  The tools that the FDA allowed under RiskMAPs 
to reduce abuse included a process to screen patients for drug appro-
priateness, a higher standard of documentation, patient education re-
quirements, patient and provider registration requirements, and man-
datory lab tests.108  Despite criticisms that RiskMAPs sacrificed effi-
ciency in the drug approval process, RiskMAPs became the precursor 
for Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategies, otherwise known as 
REMS.109  
 
B. FDA Authority After the FDAAA 
 
In 2007, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendment Act (FDAAA), which gave the FDA greater authority to 
regulate prescription drugs, including prescription pain relievers 
known as opioids.110  The FDAAA is considered to be “the most pro-
found reworking of the U.S. drug regulatory framework in half a cen-
tury.”111  For the first time, the FDA had the authority to extensively 
regulate drugs after the drug approval process.112   
 
1. General Overview of REMS Content 
In Title IX of the FDAAA, Congress gave the FDA the authority 
to require Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategies (REMS) as part of 
every drug application.113  It also gave the FDA the discretion to de-
  
 107 Id. at 2.  
 108 See Foxhall, supra note 105. 
 109 See Henry I. Miller & David R. Henderson, The FDA’s Risky Risk-
Aversion, POL’Y REV., Oct.-Nov. 2007, at 6, 20-21.  
 110 See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2011).  
 111 Barbara Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 419, 419 (2010). 
 112 See FDAAA § 355-1. 
 113 There is some overlap in the regulatory approaches of RiskMAPs and 
REMS. There is some overlap in the regulatory approaches of RiskMAPs and REMS.  
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK 
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS), REMS ASSESSMENTS, AND 
PROPOSED REMS MODIFICATIONS (DRAFT) 2-4 (2009), available at 
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/UCM184128.pdf. The FDA explained in a draft for an industry guidance report 
that the principles included in RiskMAPs have essentially become the same principles 
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cide what types of risk mitigation strategies drug manufacturers 
should incorporate into their REMS.114  The FDAAA organized 
REMS strategies into three tiers so that the FDA could apply less bur-
densome strategies to drugs with the least severe health risks and 
more burdensome strategies to drugs associated with the most severe 
health risks. 
The least burdensome mitigation strategy consists of a series of 
assessments by which the manufacturer evaluates its drug’s risks at 
eighteen months, three years, and seven years after receiving drug 
approval from the FDA.115  The Secretary of DHHS can waive the 
assessment at seven years, if she believes that the drug’s risks were 
adequately assessed at three years.116  However, if the FDA feels that 
the minimal strategy is insufficient based on the potential risks associ-
ated with the drug, it can require the manufacturer to comply with 
additional strategies.  
The middle-tier mitigation strategy consists of programs devel-
oped by the manufacturers for the purpose of educating providers and 
patients about a drug’s risks through medication guides, package in-
serts, and/or a communication plan.117  Since 2007, the FDA has re-
quired medication guides in all REMS and has required communica-
tion plans in some.118  A medication guide identifies important infor-
mation about a drug’s known and potential risks.119  The guides are 
given to each patient who receives the drug. 120  They are also avail-
able to patients and health care providers on the internet.121 Similarly, 
a communication plan is a packet of information that manufacturers 
send to health care providers within sixty days of drug approval and 
includes a “Dear Healthcare Provider Letter” explaining that the pur-
pose of the information is to make them aware of the drug’s potential 
  
used in REMS, except REMS expands the scope of potential strategies that the FDA 
can require to mitigate risk. Id. at 3-4.   
 114 Id. at 2-3. 
 115 See FDAAA § 355-1(d).  
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. § 355-1(e). 
 118 See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsa
ndProviders/ucm111350.htm (last updated Oct. 6, 2011). 
 119 See Content and Format of a Medication Guide, 21 C.F.R. § 208.20(b)(6) 
(2011); see e.g., Acterma Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), FDA, 13 
(Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationf
orPatientsandProviders/UCM202044.pdf [hereinafter Acterma]. 
 120 See Content and Format of a Medication Guide, supra note 119.   
 121 See generally Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies 
(REMS), supra note 118.  
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and known risks.122   The packet contains copies of the medication 
guide and the professional label that will accompany the drug after 
approval.123 
For drugs that the FDA finds inherently dangerous, it may require 
manufacturers to comply with the highest tier of risk management.  
This mitigation strategy, which is the most burdensome, is known as 
Elements to Assure Safe Use (ETASU).124  The Secretary determines 
that manufacturers should comply with ETASUs when (1) their drug 
has been associated with adverse drug experiences, (2) the FDA 
would deny or withdraw the drug’s approval without ETASUs, and 
(3) the risks of the drug are not adequately mitigated by the basic 
strategies.125  Under ETASUs, the FDA may require manufacturers to 
develop drug training and special certification examinations, designate 
specific drug dispensing locations, increase documentation of safe 
use, implement patient monitoring, and encourage patient enrollment 
in a drug-specific registry.126  
Since 2007, the FDA has required some combination of ETASUs 
in 20 of the 146 approved REMS.127  For example, the FDA approved 
Butrans (buprenorphine), an opioid administered through a patch 
placed on the patient’s skin for managing moderate to severe chronic 
pain.128  Before granting drug approval, the FDA required the manu-
facturer, Purdue Pharma L.P., to create a REMS with the ETASU of 
special training for health care providers.129  The manufacturer devel-
oped a training program that provided general guidance on opioid use 
  
 122 See FDAAA § 355-1(e)(3); see Acterma, supra note 119, at 2. 
 123 See Acterma, supra note 119, at 10.    
 124 See FDAAA § 355-1(f)(3).  
 125 See id. § 355-1(f)(1)(A)-(B). 
 126 Id. § 355-1(f)(3)(A)-(F); see infra Part III.B. 
 127 See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), supra 
note 118. 
 128 Butrans: Full Prescribing Information, PURDUE PHARM., 1 (June 2011), 
http://www.purduepharma.com/pi/prescription/ButransPI.pdf.  Even though Bu-
prenorphine is an opioid, it has become a popular drug used to treat opioid addictions 
because it has lower abuse potential and has been associated with mild withdrawal 
symptoms.  Clinical Guidelines for the Use of Buprenorphine in the Treatment of 
Opioid Addiction, SAMSHA, 6 (2004), 
http://buprenorphine.samhsa.gov/Bup_Guidelines.pdf. 
 129 Since the FDA has not decided on a standard opioid REMS, the FDA has 
required REMS with ETASUs on an ad hoc basis as manufacturers have presented 
opioids for drug approval.  See PURDUE PHARMA L.P., Butrans: Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 2 (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationf
orPatientsandProviders/UCM220880.pdf. 
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and specific advice about appropriate patient selection and abuse risks 
associated with Butrans.130   
Because opioids are associated with adverse drug events that the 
FDA believes cannot be mitigated by less burdensome strategies, the 
FDA has approved opioids such as Butrans with a REMS containing 
ETASUs.131  However, each time an opioid has come up for approval 
since 2007, the FDA has developed a new REMS by modifying the 
required ETASUs.  Under the current opioid approval process, the 
FDA reviews an application, decides what combination of ETASUs to 
require, and notifies the manufacturer of its decision.  This process is 
labor intensive for FDA employees and makes the drug approval 
process very inefficient.  For manufacturers, the current process sig-
nificantly delays their ability to put the drug on the market.  Delays 
cause lost revenue that could have been used to fund further research 
and development of new drugs.132 
If the FDA used the same REMS for all opioid drug applications, 
it would not only improve the efficiency of the FDA’s drug approval 
process, it would improve manufacturer compliance with the require-
ments.  Under a general opioid REMS process, manufacturers would 
be able to better anticipate the FDA’s expectations.133  If manufactur-
ers knew what type of REMS they had to complete in order to acquire 
drug approval for an opioid, they could contact the individuals neces-
sary to help them complete the REMS in advance of drug approval.134  
These individuals may be scattered across the organization, so having 
advance notice would prevent delays caused by tracking them down 
and coordinating their participation.135  Furthermore, a general opioid 
REMS would allow manufacturers to ask for clarification of any re-
quirement.  Recognizing the benefits to manufacturers and the drug 
approval process, the FDA began drafting a general opioid REMS 
proposal.  Unfortunately, the FDA has encountered difficulty develop-
ing a widely-accepted proposal.136   
 
 
 
  
 130 Id. 
 131 Id.  
 132 See id. at 3. 
 133 Dealing With REMS Challenges in Drug Commercialization, 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMMERCE, 1 (Aug. 19, 2009), 
http://www.mckesson.com/static_files/McKesson.com/McKSpecialty/PDFs/REMS%
20article%20reprint-8-09.pdf. 
 134 Id. at 2.  
 135 Id. at 2-3. 
 136 See infra Part II.B.2.  
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2. Initial Opioid REMS Proposal 
The FDA did not present a proposal for a general opioid REMS 
until July 22, 2010, at the Joint Meeting between the Anesthetic and 
Life Support Drugs Advisory Committee and the Drug Safety and 
Risk Management Advisory Committee (Joint Meeting).137  The delay 
between approval of the FDAAA and the FDA’s first opioid REMS 
proposal is likely explained by the medical complexity of opioids and 
the widespread disagreement about how to design an opioid REMS.138  
Also, the FDA likely wanted to proceed cautiously because of the 
potentially high financial burden an opioid REMS would place on key 
stakeholders in the pharmaceutical and health care industries.139  
Manufacturers will experience financial burdens when the FDA re-
quires them to create and offer training programs to health care pro-
viders prescribing their drugs.  This is in addition to the financial bur-
den manufacturers have already had to incur because of REMS re-
quirements associated with nonopioids.  Similarly, health care provid-
ers will experience financial burdens when they attend the training 
programs rather than spend time with patients. 
The FDA first announced its plan to create an opioid REMS on 
February 6, 2009, with a letter to opioid manufacturers.140  During the 
first six months of 2009, the FDA created an Industry Working Group 
comprised of pharmaceutical industry representatives to discuss and 
develop an opioid REMS.141  In the following months, the FDA 
granted drug approval to two new opioids, indicating that when the 
FDA finalizes an opioid REMS, the manufacturers may have to revise 
their current REMS in order to comply with future policy changes.142  
In December 2009, the FDA invited key stakeholders to work on de-
  
 137 See generally Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 1. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Transcript for FDA’s Media Briefing on the Safe Use of Opioids, 
supra note 14, at 2. 
 141 See, e.g., Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies for Certain Opioid 
Drugs; Notice of Public Meeting, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,568, 59,568 (Nov. 18, 2009).  A 
special exception was made to antitrust laws to enable many significant stake holders 
of the pharmaceutical industry to meet with each other.  See Coleman, supra note 54, 
at 42. 
 142 In July 2009, the FDA approved Onsolis, a short-acting opioid, to manage 
pain in cancer patients.  Then, in August 2009, the FDA approved Embeda, a long-
acting opioid, for moderate to severe pain.  See Current State of Opioid Drug Ap-
provals, FDA,  
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm187976.htm (last  
updated Nov. 20, 2009).  
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veloping the first opioid REMS proposal.143  Six months later, how-
ever, at the Joint Meeting, the advisory committees voted to reject the 
initial opioid REMS proposal because it required “more teeth.”144 
The initial proposal for opioid REMS consisted of a medication 
guide, communication plan, and the ETASU of additional voluntary 
training for health care providers.145  The medication guide was in-
tended as the primary form of education for health care providers who 
prescribe the opioid, and patients who receive the prescription.146  
Before this proposal, there were several medication guides used by 
drug manufacturers of opioids.147  The initial opioid REMS proposal 
recommended that manufacturers and the FDA work to consolidate 
some of the preexisting medication guides.  After the consolidation 
effort, manufacturers would have at their disposal a standard medica-
tion guide for each of the following: oral long-acting opioids, trans-
dermal patch long-acting opioids, and tablet and oral solutions of 
methadone hydrochloride.148    
In addition to the medication guide, the initial opioid REMS pro-
posal required a communication plan.149  No specific alterations were 
made to this strategy.  Communication plans under the initial proposal 
followed the recommendation in the FDAAA, which requires drug 
manufacturers to send letters to key stakeholders, including prescrib-
ers, dispensers, state licensing authorities, professional associations, 
and all other DEA registrants, informing them of the known and po-
tential risks of the drug.150   
Finally, the initial proposal recommended that the FDA exercise 
its authority to require an ETASU, specifically voluntary training for 
health care providers, developed by the manufacturers.151  The train-
  
 143 See Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies for Certain Opioid Drugs; 
Meeting Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,568.  
 144 See Joint Meeting of the Anesthetic and Life Support Drugs Advisory 
Committee and the Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committee; Meeting 
Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. at 32,188; see also Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 
232. 
 145 See generally Industry Working Group Presentation of Risk Evaluation 
and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for Extended-Release and Long-Acting Opioid 
Products, FDA (July 22-23, 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/ComitteesMeetingMaterials 
/Drugs/AnestheticAndLifeSupportDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM220952.pdf [here-
inafter Industry Working Group]. 
 146 Id. at 14.  
 147 See id. 
 148 Id. at 14-15. 
 149 Id. at 17.  
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 23, 25. 
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ing would improve prescribers’ ability to select suitable patients and 
counsel them on the associated risks.152  The training would also serve 
as a reminder that the patient and the prescriber should carefully read 
the medication guide.153  The FDA would conduct an ongoing assess-
ment of whether the training was successful.154  The tools used for 
detecting changes in opioid prescribing patterns after the implementa-
tion of opioid REMS would be database studies and surveillance stud-
ies conducted by an external review board called the Sponsor Man-
agement Group (SMG).155  If the SMG found that doctors failed to 
participate in the training program and their overall prescribing pat-
terns did not change significantly, the FDA would make a recommen-
dation to the DEA about incorporating a training requirement into the 
doctors’ DEA registration process.156 Even though the advisory com-
mittees rejected the initial opioid REMS proposal, the FDA should 
continue to work towards implementing an opioid-specific REMS 
because opioids are a unique class of drugs with a high risk for 
abuse.157  Through a general opioid REMS, the FDA can help ensure 
that the benefits of using opioids for pain relief always outweigh the 
risks.158   
 
III. OPIOID REMS: LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND 
IDENTIFYING FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 
 
A. Lessons From the Initial Opioid REMS            
Proposal 
 
1. Voluntary Prescriber Training 
 
In the initial proposal, the FDA relied on the ETASU of training 
to reduce opioid risks.  The FDA included a training program that 
would educate prescribers on appropriate patient selection, dosing, 
  
 152 Id. at 24.  
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. at 25.  
 155 The Sponsor Management Group would be an advisory committee created 
within the FDA to analyze data and track changes to opioid prescribing patterns. Id. at 
39.  
 156 Id. at 25.  The current DEA registration process consists of a written appli-
cation customized to the applicant based on the purpose for which the applicant will 
be handling the controlled substances.  See Registration Procedures, DEA, 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugreg/process.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). 
 157 See Background on Opioid REMS, FDA, 
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm187975.htm (last 
updated Nov. 20, 2009). 
 158 Id.  
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and patient monitoring.159  While the information conveyed in the 
training program is unquestionably valuable, the FDA’s suggestion of 
voluntary training is insufficient to improve prescribing habits.160  
Doctors will likely decide against voluntary training, not because they 
fail to appreciate the importance of training, but simply because their 
demanding schedules do not allow it.  If many doctors choose not to 
attend the training program, then prescribing habits for opioids will 
not improve in a way that reduces opioid abuse, diversion, and under-
treatment. 
At the Joint Meeting, several speakers suggested that a simple so-
lution to improving the next opioid REMS proposal is to make train-
ing mandatory.161  While this seems logical, it is not necessarily feasi-
ble, at least for the FDA.  The FDA controls drug approval, labeling, 
and manufacturing standards by regulating the manufacturers.162  It 
does not have regulatory authority over doctors and cannot enforce a 
training requirement.163  Since the FDA is unable to single-handedly 
improve opioid prescribing habits, it needs help from other regulatory 
agencies.  
At the federal level, the DEA may be able to assist the FDA by 
requiring doctors to complete an opioid training program prior to re-
ceiving a DEA registration number.164  A DEA registration number 
permits doctors, pharmacists, and distributers to lawfully handle con-
trolled substances.165  The current process requires an applicant to 
complete a written application and mail it to the nearest DEA field 
office, along with payment for a processing fee.166  In the future, the 
DEA could require doctors to show proof that they attended an ap-
proved opioid training course as part of the application process.  Al-
though this is not an immediate solution to increasing regulation of 
prescribers, it has the potential to provide long-term support to the 
FDA’s efforts.167 
  
 159 See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 44. 
 160 See id. at 29. 
 161 Id. at 29-30. 
 162 See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2011); see supra Part II.A. 
 163 See FDAAA § 355-1.  
 164 Registration Procedures, supra note 156.  
 165 See Registration Categories and Fees, DEA, 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugreg/categories.htm#manufact (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2011). 
 166 Registration Procedures, supra note 156. 
 167 DEA involvement in requiring training for doctors prescribing opioids is 
not an immediate solution because it would require Congress to pass a law authoriz-
ing the DEA to require doctors to attend training before prescribing opioids to pa-
tients for pain.   Buprenorphine, which is an opioid used to treat people addicted to 
drugs, illustrates this process.  Congress passed the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 
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At the state level, medical boards may be able to assist the FDA 
by requiring doctors to complete continuing medical education on 
opioids. The Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) plays an 
influential role in medical practice at the state level.  It represents sev-
enty professional medical organizations and 750,000 practicing physi-
cians.168  The FSMB has already released professional guidelines for 
prescribing opioids, indicating that it recognizes the seriousness of 
opioid problems. The FSMB has the ability to persuade state legisla-
tures to include opioid training as part of the medical licensure re-
quirements.  Since the manufacturers are responsible for the develop-
ment and cost of the training programs, changing the state laws to 
include an opioid training program would not be a significant finan-
cial burden on the states.  With the help of state-level regulatory agen-
cies, opioid regulation would extend beyond manufacturers.         
While changes may take place in the form of increased FDA col-
laboration with the DEA and state medical boards, manufacturers 
should continue to develop and offer the requisite training programs.  
Manufacturers understand their drugs the best.  They conduct exten-
sive clinical trials and complete a thorough application process in or-
der to earn drug approval from the FDA.169  Manufacturers can use 
information they gathered prior to drug approval to design the training 
and can use information they gather postapproval to revise the training 
from time to time.  Additionally, manufacturers are likely to have the 
financial resources to fund ongoing training efforts.   
Prescriber training programs developed and implemented by the 
manufacturer, however, raise concerns about conflict of interest, spe-
cifically that a drug manufacturer will promote its own drug through 
information presented in the training program.  Critics should realize 
that the FDA still has the authority to approve or reject the manufac-
turer’s proposed training program.  In other words, if the FDA finds 
that the training is biased towards the manufacturer’s drug, the FDA 
  
2000 (DATA 2000), which gave the DEA the authority to require doctors prescribing 
buprenorphine for drug addictions to obtain a special registration number.  In order to 
get the special registration number, doctors have to meet one of seven requirements to 
be a “qualified physician.”  See infra Part III.B.1.  Once doctors meet the require-
ments and obtain a registration number, they cannot write a valid opioid prescription 
as part of a patient’s addiction treatment unless they include their special registration 
number.  Congress would have to pass a new law, if the DEA were to apply similar 
registration requirements on doctors who prescribe opioids for pain treatment.  See 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin., Buprenorphine: Physician 
Waiver Qualifications, BUPRENORPHINE.SAMHSA.GOV, 
http://buprenorphine.samhsa.gov/waiver_qualifications.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2011). 
 168 See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 88. 
 169 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2011).  
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can deny the manufacturer’s drug approval.  If the FDA has already 
granted drug approval and discovers the manufacturer is presenting 
biased information, the FDA can rescind the approval and remove the 
manufacturer’s drug from the market.  
The FDA could also extend the investigatory framework it applies 
to food and drugs to the training programs, which would allow the 
FDA to continuously monitor the quality and content of the training 
programs offered by manufacturers.170  Through cooperation between 
regulatory agencies at the state and federal level, the FDA can im-
prove oversight of information presented to doctors about opioids and 
ensure that a manufacturer’s bias does not interfere with a doctor’s 
training experience. Monitoring training programs across the country 
might be difficult and expensive, if the format of the program is face-
to-face instruction.  However, if the FDA allows manufacturers to 
fulfill the training ETASU by creating an educational platform such as 
an interactive website with tutorials and an on-line certification ex-
amination, continuous monitoring of a website would be less costly 
for the FDA and state officials commissioned to conduct the investi-
gations.171  In addition, a web-based training program would be more 
cost effective for manufacturers than a program based on face-to-face 
instruction.172 
 
2. Public Education  
 
The FDA properly included opioid training for prescribers in the 
initial proposal, but it failed to address educational opportunities for 
  
 170 For continuous regulation of approved foods and drugs, the FDA relies on 
help from the states because the states share jurisdiction over the products located 
within their boundaries.  Individuals who conduct examinations, inspections and 
investigations for the FDA are either: (1) FDA employees recognized by the state as 
an agent or special representative; or (2) a state regulatory officials commissioned by 
the FDA.  See FDA, CHAPTER 3: FEDERAL AND STATE COOPERATION, INVESTIGATIONS 
OPERATIONS MANUAL 92-93 (2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/default.htm.  Commissioned officials 
conduct inspections, collect samples, copy and verify records, and review official 
FDA documents.  The FDA believes that this system enhances cooperation between 
state and federal agencies on regulatory matters and “increas[es] the amount of public 
health protection afforded to the American consumer.” FDA, CHAPTER 3: 
COMMISSIONING AND WORK SHARING, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL 2, 6 (Aug. 
2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresMa
nual/UCM074334.pdf. 
 171 See infra Part IV.A. 
 172 See infra Part IV.A. 
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the general public.173  Speakers at the Joint Meeting described the 
difference between training and education by explaining that training 
focuses on helping health care providers properly diagnose patients, 
dispense drugs, and monitor patients, whereas education focuses on 
communicating drug risks to doctors, patients, and the general pub-
lic.174   
The FDA should not initially require manufacturers to fund public 
education campaigns about opioids.  Manufacturers have limited re-
sources and must maintain adequate funds for drug research, devel-
opment, and manufacturing.  The FDA should only ask manufacturers 
to spend money on developing mandatory training for prescribers.   
Training has the greatest chance of improving opioid prescribing pat-
terns and reducing opioid-related problems of abuse, diversion, and 
undertreatment.  Public education campaigns should be left to non-
profit organizations, such as the American Pain Foundation (APF), at 
least until manufacturers have absorbed the start-up cost associated 
with developing training programs for prescribers.  
The American Pain Foundation has the ability to educate the gen-
eral public on the risks of opioid treatment.175  The APF communi-
cates safety alerts to consumers and serves as a liaison to policymak-
ers about drug-related issues.176  It recently called its members to take 
action against irresponsible, biased reports on opioid abuse within the 
population of wounded American soldiers.177  Since the APF already 
conveys messages about drug risks and calls people to take action 
against issues such as drug abuse, it can play an important role in edu-
cating the public about safe opioid use.178   
 
3. Drug Diversion 
 
The initial proposal fell short of providing strategies to reduce 
drug diversion.  While drug diversion falls under the jurisdiction of 
  
 173 See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 30-32.  
 174 See id. at 27-28 (regarding training); see also id. at 30 (regarding educa-
tion).   
 175 See id. at 43.   
 176 AM. PAIN FOUND., http://www.painfoundation.org/about (last visited Oct. 
4, 2011). 
 177 The APF pointed to an article published in USA Today saying that the 
newspaper misrepresented the prevalence of opioid abuse in soldiers by indicating up 
to 35 percent of wounded soldiers have become addicted to drugs. Action Requested, 
AM. PAIN FOUND., 
http://action.painfoundation.org/site/MessageViewer?em_id=12681.0&printer_friendl
y=1 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). 
 178 Id.  
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the DEA, the FDA could have required a strategy within the opioid 
REMS proposal to help the DEA reduce the availability of drugs to 
third parties seeking to misuse and abuse opioids.  One recommenda-
tion that came out of the Joint Meeting was to create a program for 
collecting unused opioids.179  Unused or improperly disposed opioids 
increase the risk that a third party will misuse or even abuse the drugs.  
The FDA could designate places in hospitals to collect unused drugs 
as part of the REMS.180   Including more robust strategies such as this 
may help persuade the FDA advisory committees to approve a future 
opioid REMS proposal.   
 
4.   Data Collection 
 
While the initial proposal provided that ongoing assessments by 
the SMG will evaluate the efficacy of an opioid REMS, especially the 
impact of training, the initial proposal did not explain how the SMG 
will function.181  The FDA left the areas of data collection, assess-
ments, and information sharing undeveloped.  Some of the unan-
swered questions related to data collection and assessments include 
(1) what type of data will the SMG collect, (2) will the SMG publicly 
report the data, and (3) if not, who will see the reports? 
In determining the role of the SMG, the FDA should look to sev-
eral states that gather data in prescription drug monitoring programs 
(PMPs).  PMPs are electronic databases that store information about 
what drugs doctors and pharmacists dispense to patients.182  Forty-
three states have laws creating PMPs, and thirty-four states have op-
erational programs.183  Most programs are managed by state health 
departments.184  Individuals who can request data from PMPs include 
(1) licensed physicians; (2) pharmacists; (3) federal, state, and local 
law enforcement; (4) professional organizations; (5) regulatory 
boards; and (6) anyone whose prescription has been recorded in the 
database.185   
Massachusetts is representative of most PMPs because it allows 
monitoring of drugs that fall into Schedules II, III, and IV of the 
  
 179 See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 138. 
 180 See id. 
 181 See Industry Working Group, supra note 145; see supra Part II.B.2.  
 182 Nat’l Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs: A Brief Overview, NAMSDL.ORG 1, (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.namsdl.org/documents/PMPsBriefOverview8-17-2010.pdf. 
 183 Id.  
 184 Id. at 2. 
 185 Id. at 4.  
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DEA’s classification for controlled substances.186  Massachusetts’ 
PMP is funded in part by grants from the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice.187  It requires that pharmacies report to a data collection agency 
each week and no later than ten days after filling a prescription.188  
Data points that must be sent to the agency include customer identifi-
cation numbers, locations where customers filled prescriptions, the 
customer’s relation to the patient if they are not the same individual, 
and quantities of the drugs dispensed.189  Since most state laws permit 
PMPs to share data with law enforcement and regulatory agencies,190 
the FDA and the SMG should strongly consider using PMP data to 
monitor changes in opioid prescribing habits. 
 
5. Pilot Study 
 
The FDA should also consider conducting a pilot study for the 
next opioid REMS proposal prior to its approval.  The goal of the 
study would be to simulate the implementation of opioid REMS using 
one manufacturer seeking drug approval for a new opioid drug.  The 
study would allow the FDA to work out any unanticipated difficulties 
in having the manufacturer offer prescriber training programs.  It 
would also allow the FDA to receive feedback from doctors who at-
tend the opioid training programs.  Doctors would be able to critique 
whether the information was valuable and whether it was presented in 
an appropriate manner.  A pilot study would help the FDA work out 
any glitches before requiring a large-scale implementation of the 
opioid REMS.   
  
 186 Id. at 3. Effective January 1, 2011 the record keeping for prescriptions 
expanded to drugs regulated by Schedule II-V.  See Massachusetts Department of 
Public Health Prescription Monitoring Program Fact Sheet for Pharmacy, MASS.GOV 
(Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dph/quality/drugcontrol/pmp_pharmacy_factshee
t.pdf . 
 187 Prescription Monitoring Program (PMP), MASS.GOV (Oct. 30, 2010), 
http://www.mass.gov,  (click on link for “State Government,” then “Alphabetical List, 
All Branches,” then “Executive Office of Health and Human Services,” then tab 
called “For Providers,” then “Certification, Licensure, and Registration,” then “Com-
pliance and Enforcement,” then “Drug Control,” then “Prescription Monitoring Pro-
gram”). 
 188 See Massachusetts Department of Public Health Prescription Monitoring 
Program Fact Sheet for Pharmacy, supra note 186.  
 189 Additional data points include information about whether prescription 
partially filled, method of payment, electronic prescription reference number, whether 
patient is resident of the U.S., and whether prescription is compounded.  Id. at 2-4.   
 190 See Nat’l Alliance for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 182, at 4. 
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Congress did not give express authority to the FDA through the 
FDAAA to conduct a pilot study of an opioid REMS before imple-
menting it across the entire class of opioids.191  At the Joint Meeting, 
an FDA representative pointed out that conducting a pilot study for 
opioid REMS would be difficult without explicit statutory author-
ity.192  Rather than proposing new legislation, the FDA should reallo-
cate money within its budget to fund the pilot study and seek volun-
tary participation by one or more drug manufacturers.  If attempts to 
do this are unsuccessful, the FDA should consider looking at risk 
management programs created by the states.193  However, one draw-
back to looking at state programs is that the FDA may not have the 
opportunity to observe the efficacy of specific ETASUs, if the states 
observed have not taken an approach modeled after ETASUs.194   
 
B. Opportunities Under the FDAAA  
The FDA advisory committee rejected the initial opioid REMS 
proposal because it only included voluntary training for prescribers, 
which is one of six ETASUs available to the FDA under the highest 
risk mitigation strategy.195  At first glance, it looks as though the FDA 
could have included more ETASUs in the first opioid REMS pro-
posal.  However, the following subsections describe the extent to 
which the FDA can incorporate ETASUs in the next opioid REMS 
proposal. 
 
1.  Certification  
 
Under the FDAAA, the FDA can ask manufacturers to create cer-
tification programs for pharmacists, doctors, and health care facili-
ties.196  If the FDA required manufacturers to develop a certification 
examination as part of an opioid REMS, health care professionals 
would have to complete the examination before prescribing and dis-
  
 191 See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 206. 
 192 Id.  
 193 Id. at 39. 
 194 See John F. Peppin, Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): A 
Short Critique: Some Problems with REMS, MEDSCAPE TODAY (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/725604_2.  
 195 Recall that the FDA can require ETASUs of drug training, special drug 
certification, limitations on dispensing location, documentation of lab results dis-
pensed along with the drug, patient monitoring, and mandatory patient enrollment in a 
drug-specific registry. See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)(A)-(F) (2011).  
 196 See id. § 355-1(f)(3)(B). 
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pensing opioids.197  Certification is a tool, similar to training, which 
can improve the competency of health care professionals regarding 
the risks of opioid use.  However, if the FDA exercises its authority to 
implement a special drug certification program, it would duplicate 
some preexisting DEA requirements for doctors who treat patients 
with drug addictions.   
Under DEA regulations, doctors who wish to treat patients ad-
dicted to opioids must first meet the standards of a “qualifying physi-
cian.”198  They can meet that standard by completing one of the fol-
lowing: (1) state board certification in the addiction psychiatry sub-
specialty, (2) addiction certification from the Society of Addiction 
Medicine, (3) American Osteopathic Association board certification in 
the addiction medicine subspecialty, (4) eight or more hours of train-
ing from a professional medical organization, (5) participation in a 
clinical trial that led to drug approval, (6) sufficient training as speci-
fied by a state medical licensing board, or (7) any other training that 
the Secretary of DHHS finds sufficient to show that a physician is 
competent to prescribe opioids to patients.199  
Given the similarity between the DEA’s requirements for qualify-
ing physicians and the FDA’s potential authority under the certifica-
tion ETASU, the FDA would duplicate some of the DEA’s efforts.  
The overlap would occur in the case of doctors who treat patients cur-
rently addicted to opioids.  While this would not affect all doctors, 
duplication in this subset of health care providers would force some 
doctors to spend twice as much time and money on certification.  
Over the long-term, this could deter some doctors from prescribing 
opioids, which would limit patient access to pain relief and cause 
widespread undertreatment of acute and chronic pain.  It might also 
deter some doctors from treating patients addicted to opioids, which 
would be equally problematic.   
Duplication could be avoided if the Secretary of DHHS recog-
nizes that the FDA certification program satisfies the DEA require-
ments under subsection (7) of the qualifying physician standard.  
However, the Secretary has not yet addressed whether opioid training 
developed by a manufacturer for a REMS would fall within the scope 
of subsection (7).    Conversely, the Secretary has also not addressed 
whether the DEA’s qualifying physician standard could satisfy the 
  
 197 Id. 
 198 The DEA requires doctors to have special certification to treat patients 
addicted to opioids because typical treatment involves drugs like methadone and 
buprenorphine, which carry their own health risks. 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(G)(ii)(I)-
(VII) (2011). 
 199 Id.  
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certification ETASU and save manufacturers from developing a new 
system of certification. 
 
2.  Dispensing Locations 
 
The FDA can also impose limitations on drug dispensing loca-
tions.200  The FDA has not addressed this ETASU in great detail dur-
ing public meetings on opioid REMS.201  Without more information, it 
is difficult to know how the FDA would implement this ETASU to 
reduce the risks of abuse, undertreatment, and diversion.  Limiting 
opioid dispensing locations has the potential to mitigate the risk of 
diversion by further controlling who receives opioids.  Since the 
DEA’s primary concern is regulating the diversion of drugs for illicit 
use, this ETASU is more relevant to the DEA’s mission than the 
FDA’s objectives.   Thus, the FDA should focus its efforts on incor-
porating other ETASUs into the next opioid REMS proposal. 
 
3. Patient Monitoring  
The FDA can also require the ETASU of patient monitoring in the 
next opioid REMS proposal,202 which includes techniques such as 
drug testing and pill counting.203  Patient monitoring helps doctors 
track whether patients are following their recommended treatment 
course.  However, if the FDA required doctors to conduct drug testing 
or pill counts, it would overstep its authority by regulating the practice 
of medicine.  
On several occasions courts have considered whether the federal 
government has the authority to regulate medical practice or whether 
that is an area of law reserved for the states.204  Most recently, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Gonzales v. Oregon.205   In this 
case, the Attorney General argued that the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) gave him the authority to prohibit doctors from using con-
  
 200 FDAAA § 355-1(f)(3)(C). 
 201 See, e.g., Transcript for FDA’s Media Briefing on the Safe Use of Opioids, 
supra note 14. 
 202 FDAAA § 355-1(f)(3)(E). 
 203 See Andrea M. Trescot et al., Opioids in the Management of Chronic Non-
Cancer Pain: An Update of American Society of the Interventional Pain Physi-
cians’(ASIPP) Guidelines, 11 PAIN PHYSICIAN S5, S41 (2008).  
 204 Parties defending the rights of the states to regulate medicine look to the 
10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which states “[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively…” U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 205 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006).   
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trolled substances for physician-assisted suicide.206  The Supreme 
Court explained that even though Congress has the authority to regu-
late medical practice in order to prevent doctors from promoting illicit 
drug trafficking, Congress lacks the authority to regulate medical 
practice generally.207  Furthermore, while Congress delegated some of 
its authority to the Attorney General under the CSA, the Attorney 
General’s authority was specifically limited to promulgating and en-
forcing rules that (1) relate to manufacturing, distributing, and dis-
pensing controlled substances; and (2) are necessary to his functions 
under the CSA’s subchapter “Control and Enforcement.”208  The Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that Congress granted the Attorney 
General broad implied authority that would include regulation of phy-
sician-assisted suicide.209  The Supreme Court, instead, reasoned that 
interpreting the Attorney General’s power more broadly to cover an 
area of medical practice, such as physician-assisted suicide, would 
“transform the carefully described limits on the Attorney General’s 
authority over registration and scheduling into mere suggestions.”210  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Oregon was consis-
tent with prior cases concerning the authority of federal regulatory 
agencies and the practice of medicine.  Two decades before Gonzales, 
the Fifth Circuit considered the limits of the FDA’s authority  in U.S. 
v. Evers.211  A doctor, who was accused of violating the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, produced an FDA notice from the Federal 
Register as evidence that the FDA should not be regulating his prac-
tice of medicine.212  In the FDA’s own words, “Congress did not in-
tend the Food and Drug Administration to interfere with medical prac-
tice.”213  As a result, the Evers court declined to reconsider the district 
court’s decision that the federal government was prohibited from in-
terfering with a doctor’s prescription practices.  The court explained 
that medical practice is not an area generally regulated by the federal 
government or one of its agencies.214   
  
 206 Id. at 248-49.   
 207 Id. at 269-70.  
 208 Id. at 259.  
 209 Id. at 260.  
 210 Id. at 260-61.  
 211 See U.S. v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043 (1981). 
 212 Id. at 1048. 
 213 FDA Actions Against Unapproved Uses of Approved Prescription Drugs, 
37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,503 (proposed Aug. 15, 1972). The notice that the doctor 
submitted as evidence was to announce proposed legislation, but it never became law. 
Id.  The FDA repeated the quote again in a notice about drug labeling in 2003. Label-
ing Requirements for Systemic Antibacterial Drug Products Intended for Human Use, 
68 Fed. Reg. 6,062, 6,071 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
 214 Evers, 643 F.2d at 1049. 
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If the FDA decides to require the patient monitoring ETASU as 
part of an opioid REMS in the future, it should expect to face chal-
lenges from doctors and state medical boards on the theory that the 
federal government is not authorized to regulate the practice of medi-
cine.  This potential challenge may explain why the FDAAA proposed 
several ETASUs and made them optional strategies.  It may also ex-
plain why the FDA did not include the patient monitoring ETASU in 
the initial opioid REMS proposal.  The FDA may believe that patient 
monitoring is an indispensible component of opioid regulation, but it 
should be careful not to overstep its authority and should leave en-
forcement of this ETASU to state medical boards instead. 
 
4.  Drug Registries 
 
The FDAAA also gives the FDA authority to include a drug regis-
try in the next opioid REMS proposal.215  However, as discussed in 
the previous section, the FDA likely lacks the authority to require 
prescribers to record patient data in a drug registry.  Therefore, the 
success of this ETASU will depend on the voluntary participation of 
pharmacists, doctors, and nurses. 
If the FDA seriously considers incorporating a drug registry into 
the next opioid REMS proposal, it should look to the states.216  Using 
information gathered by the states would cut down on the cost of im-
plementation and prevent duplication in data collection.  The FDA 
should also consider looking at registries used in other areas of medi-
cine.  Registries are frequently used in obstetrics to estimate the risks 
of prenatal prescription drugs by recording data from pregnant moth-
ers.217  Health care providers report data on birth defects and fetal 
losses associated with prescription drugs to a registry using a toll-free 
number.218  With any database, however, there are privacy concerns.  
The more patient-identifying information a database contains, the 
greater the privacy concerns.  If the FDA considers moving forward 
with its own drug registry, it should carefully weigh the benefit of a 
national drug registry created by the FDA, against the costs, which 
include the financial burden of developing and maintaining the regis-
try, as well as the risks to patient privacy.   
  
 215 Registry refers to a database of information used to track trends the health 
conditions of a particular population of patients.  See FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-
1(f)(3)(F) (2011). 
 216 See supra Part III.A.4. 
 217 Margaret A. Honein et al., Evaluation of Selected Characteristics of Preg-
nancy Drug Registries, 60 TERATOLOGY 356, 356 (1999). 
 218 Id. at 357. 
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IV. RECOMMENDED STRATEGY FOR THE FDA AND STATE 
MEDICAL BOARDS 
 
Considering the lessons learned from the initial opioid REMS 
proposal and the limitations of the FDAAA, the FDA should employ a 
three-fold strategy going forward.  It should involve (1) the FDA de-
veloping an opioid REMS proposal with a web-based training pro-
gram funded by manufacturers, (2) the state legislatures enforcing 
opioid training requirements and issuing opioid registration numbers 
to doctors, and (3) the FDA collaborating with the states on data col-
lection.   
 
A.  Training Program 
 
When the FDA drafts the next opioid REMS proposal, it should 
require an opioid training program with content covering all types of 
opioids, including immediate-release and extended-release opioids.219  
The program should advise doctors on how to distinguish between 
patients who are less likely to abuse opioids and those who are more 
likely.  Recognizing the latter category of patients requires the skills 
to identify withdrawal symptoms and uncover a patient’s history of 
substance abuse.  In order to help improve drug abuse detection, the 
program should include multimedia, such as videos and pictures, to 
help illustrate drug abuse behaviors in patients of all age cohorts and 
racial groups.   
Doctors not only have to identify patients who are good candi-
dates for opioids, they also have to write a prescription for an appro-
priate dose based on the patient’s age, weight, and health condition.  
The training program should discuss the appropriate types of opioids 
and corresponding doses for treating both chronic and acute pain pa-
tients.220  It would be helpful if the program presented a checklist of 
considerations, which doctors could routinely review when making 
decisions about opioid prescriptions.   
The FDA should develop and maintain the training program or 
hire a third party, such as a professional organization of pain physi-
cians, to do so.  Development and maintenance of the training pro-
gram should be funded by manufacturers based on the market share 
they hold in the opioid industry.  The market share calculations should 
be based on each pharmaceutical company’s gross earnings from 
  
 219 See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 192-93.  
 220 See supra Part I.A.3. 
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opioids during the previous calendar year.  Under this system, smaller 
pharmaceutical companies introducing just one or two opioid products 
into the market would not be burdened by a significant training pro-
gram expense.    
The FDA should ensure that there is one uniform training pro-
gram for opioids rather than individual programs developed by each 
manufacturer.  If every manufacturer had to create a program, it 
would be unnecessarily duplicative and would place a very heavy 
financial burden on manufacturers. The burden would be especially 
heavy if the training programs involved face-to-face instruction be-
cause the manufacturers would have to hire individuals each year to 
teach the courses at various locations across the country.  Further-
more, placing a heavy financial burden on manufacturers would likely 
have the unintended consequence of discouraging some manufacturers 
from seeking opioid drug approval.  If fewer manufacturers entered 
the market, pharmaceutical development would slow and patient ac-
cess to safe pain relief would be hindered.  Thus, the FDA, or a third 
party hired by the FDA, should develop a web-based training program 
because, among other reasons, it is a more cost-effective approach.   
A web-based training program would be better than face-to-face 
instruction for several reasons.  First, a web-based program allows 
doctors to take the course at a time and place of their choice.221  Doc-
tors would not have to pay to travel to a training program or rearrange 
their schedule in order to attend.  Secondly, the information would be 
easy to access from either a personal or public computer.222  A doctor 
would register for a username and password, which they could use to 
save their progress on the training program each time they logged out 
of the website.  Finally, a web-based training program would make it 
easier for the FDA or a third party to update the training information 
as new data becomes available.223 
A web-based training program would have its limitations.  Doc-
tors who do not have a strong internet connection for viewing multi-
media might have difficulty completing the course.224  Technical sup-
port would be required to resolve these types of problems.  A web-
based program would also require the doctors to take more personal 
initiative to complete all of the lessons and read all of the material.225  
In order to ensure that the doctors complete the program with a certain 
  
 221 Wallace Hannum, Web-Based Training: Advantages and Limitations, in 
WEB-BASED TRAINING 16 (Badrual H. Khan ed., 2001).  
 222 Id.  
 223 Id.  
 224 Id. at 19. 
 225 Id.  
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level of competence, the FDA should consider including a certifica-
tion examination as the last step of the training program.   
The certification examination should consist of fifty or so multi-
ple-choice questions randomly generated from a database of several 
hundred multiple-choice questions.  The certification exam at the end 
of the training program would not be as rigorous as the board certifi-
cation requirement applied to doctors prescribing opioids to patients 
for addiction treatment.226  Nonetheless, doctors might be tempted to 
skip over material or have another individual take the certification 
exam on their behalf.  The FDA should require doctors to complete a 
signature form, which states that they completed the exam without the 
assistance of another person and that the exam reflects their level of 
competency in the area of opioid prescribing.  The doctors would then 
send the signature form to the medical board in the state where they 
practice medicine.  The state medical boards should complete the re-
maining administrative steps for this recommended strategy. 
 
B. State-Enforced Training Requirement 
 
The states should assume the responsibility of enforcing doctor 
participation in the opioid training program.  However, rather than 
requiring all doctors to complete opioid training, the states should 
only require doctors writing opioid prescriptions for pain to pass the 
certification examination.  While this policy would still require many 
doctors to complete the training program, including surgeons, general 
practitioners, and even dentists, it would allow doctors who do not 
want to prescribe opioids to opt out of the training program and certi-
fication process. 
If participating doctors finish the training and take the certifica-
tion examination, they should complete the process by sending the 
signature form to their state medical board.  Staff at the medical board 
should check the name of the doctor on the form with the examination 
results on the training course website, confirming that the doctor 
achieved a passing score.  In addition, the staff should verify that the 
signature on the opioid training form matches the documents signed 
by the doctor when she applied for a medical license in the state.  If 
the doctor meets both requirements, the state medical board should 
issue the doctor an opioid registration number.  Thereafter, each time 
the doctor writes an opioid prescription for pain, she must put her 
opioid registration number on the prescription in order for it to be 
  
 226 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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valid.227  Pharmacists will play an important role in enforcing this 
process, since they will have to reject opioid prescriptions if doctors 
fail to include their opioid registration number on the prescription 
form.  While the financial burden on state medical boards would be 
minimal under this system, states could nonetheless impose a nominal 
fee on doctors seeking an opioid registration number to offset the ad-
ministrative costs associated with this process. 
This recommended strategy requires the states to pass a new law 
so that opioid prescriptions written for pain relief would be invalid 
unless doctors include their opioid registration number on the pre-
scription form.  If states decline to implement this strategy, the Fed-
eration of State Medical Boards (FSMB) should talk with state repre-
sentatives and persuade them to pass laws that revise the prescription 
requirements.  Given that the FSMB represents seventy professional 
medical organizations and 750,000 practicing physicians, it likely has 
the resources and support to influence state action.228  While critics 
may argue that one new federal law would be more efficient to pass 
than fifty state laws, a federal law takes years to navigate the legisla-
tive process and requires the support of Congress, which has been 
polarized on health care issues in recent years.  Additionally, the state 
governments are a better place to modify the laws of opioid prescrib-
ing than the federal government because enforcing participation in 
opioid training programs through the states reduces the risk that the 
FDA will overstep its authority by regulating the practice of medi-
cine.229  
 
C. Data Sharing 
 
The FDA should collaborate with states that use prescription drug 
monitoring programs (PMPs).  The FDA should request data from 
these programs on a quarterly basis and assess whether drug abuse 
and drug diversion problems decrease after the implementation of 
opioid REMS.  While the FDA has authority under the FDAAA to 
establish new drug registries, resources may not be available for this 
purpose.  Additionally, creation of an FDA drug registry would dupli-
cate preexisting databases at the state level.  Therefore, the key focus 
of FDA and state collaboration should be sharing data and tracking 
  
 227 This is a similar system used for regulating doctors who are administering 
addiction treatments to patients using buprenorphine.  The recommended strategy 
proposes expanding this to prescriptions for all opioids. Cf. Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Servs. Admin., supra note 167. 
 228 See Joint Meeting Transcript, supra note 15, at 86. 
 229 See supra Part III.B.3. 
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the impact of opioid REMS on prescription drug abuse, diversion, and 
undertreatment.  
There should not be any legal barriers to sharing data since most 
state laws concerning PMPs allow regulatory agencies, such as the 
FDA, to access their data.230  Although, as the states share data with 
more individuals or organizations, there is an increased risk that con-
fidential information about a patient’s health condition will fall into 
the wrong hands.  The states should consider removing from the data 
any primary identifying information, such as patients’ names or social 
security numbers, before transferring the data to the FDA.   Removing 
this information would not decrease the value of the data, since the 
FDA is primarily focused on the prevalence and trends of opioid pre-
scribing at the population level, rather than the patient level.  Addi-
tionally, the states might consider using computer software to encrypt 
the data before passing it to the FDA for analysis, but the details of 
this would require further investigation and development.   
 
D. Other Recommendations 
 
Although the recommendation for a three-fold approach would 
likely improve opioid prescribing habits, there are several issues, such 
as public education campaigns and drug collection programs, which 
are not mentioned in the strategy above.  Their omission from the 
strategy does not mean that they are any less important.  Rather, they 
are strategies that should be considered by other regulatory agencies 
and the FDA at some point in the future.  The FDA and state medical 
boards should use the recommended strategy as a short-term plan and 
reserve the other suggestions for long-term goals.  In fact, some of the 
short-term plans may help achieve the long-term goals because im-
proving doctor competency today will lead to safer opioid pain relief 
in the future.  Over the years, information about health risks associ-
ated with opioids will trickle down from health care providers to the 
general public, even without formal interventions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A common misconception is that people who abuse and misuse 
drugs do so intentionally.  Over the past decade, testimonies by pa-
tients like Betty Tully have shed light on the truth. 231    Many patients 
seeking pain relief receive not only a prescription for opioids, but a 
  
 230 See supra Part III.A.4. 
 231 See supra Part I.A.5. 
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devastating addiction through no fault of their own.   As opioid use 
becomes more prevalent, the magnitude of risk for abuse, diversion, 
and undertreatment will continue to increase.  The FDA and state 
medical boards should take advantage of the present opportunities to 
improve prescriber competence and work towards making opioids a 
safer option for pain relief.   
In 2007, Congress passed the FDAAA and significantly trans-
formed the FDA’s authority to regulate drug manufacturers.  Through 
a three-tiered system of regulation called REMS, the FDA gained the 
authority to regulate drugs after the approval process by requiring 
manufacturers to engage in risk-mitigating activities such as distribut-
ing medication guides and communication plans to doctors prescrib-
ing their drugs.  Since the advisory committees rejected the FDA’s 
initial opioid REMS proposal for being too weak, the FDA should 
strengthen the training requirements for doctors prescribing opioids to 
patients for chronic and acute pain relief.  However, the FDA cannot 
single-handedly enforce stronger regulatory requirements against doc-
tors.  State medical boards should become more involved in opioid 
regulation by requiring doctors to successfully complete an opioid 
training program and certification examination before allowing doc-
tors to write opioid prescriptions.  With the help of state medical 
boards, the FDA can achieve a proper balance between opioid regula-
tion and medically necessary opioid use. 
 
